In this paper, we consider the problem of simultaneous learning and decision-making in a stochastic game setting with a large population. We formulate this problem as a generalized mean-field game (GMFG). We first analyze the existence of the solution to this GMFG, and show that naively combining Q-learning with the three-step fixedpoint approach in classical MFGs yields unstable algorithms. We then propose an alternating approximate Q-learning algorithm with Boltzmann policy (MF-AQ) and establish its convergence property as well as its complexity. The numerical performance of this MF-AQ algorithm on repeated Ad auction problem shows superior computational efficiency, when compared with existing algorithms for multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL).
Introduction
Motivating example. This paper is motivated by the following Ad auction problem for an advertiser. An Ad auction is a stochastic game on an ad exchange platform among a large number of players, the advertisers. In between the time a web user requests a page and the time the page is displayed, usually within a millisecond, a Vickrey-type of second-best-price auction is run to incentivize interested advertisers to bid for an Ad slot to display advertisement. Each advertiser has limited information before each bid: first, her own valuation for a slot depends on an unknown conversion of clicks for the item; secondly, she, should she win the bid, only knows the reward after the user's activities on the website are finished. In addition, she has a budget constraint in this repeated auction.
The question is, how should she bid in this online sequential repeated game when there is a large population of bidders competing on the Ad platform, with unknown distributions of the conversion of clicks and rewards?
Our work. Motivated by this example of Ad auction, we consider the general problem of simultaneous learning and decision-making in a stochastic game setting with a large population. We formulate this type of games with unknown rewards and dynamics as a generalized mean-field-game (GMFG), with incorporation of action distributions. It can also be viewed as a general version of MFGs of McKeanVlasov type (Acciaio et al., 2018) , which is a different paradigm from the classical MFG. It is also beyond the scope of the existing Q-learning framework for Markov decision problem (MDP) with unknown distributions, as MDP is technically equivalent to a single player stochastic game.
On the theory front, we establish under appropriate technical conditions, the existence and uniqueness of the NE solution to this (GMFG). On the computational front, we show that naively combining Q-learning with the three-step fixedpoint approach in classical MFGs yields unstable algorithms. We then propose an alternating approximate Q-learning algorithm with Boltzmann policy (MF-AQ) and establish its convergence property. We also provide the iterative and computational complexity of the algorithm. This MF-AQ algorithm is then applied to analyze the Ad auction problem. Compared with the MF-VI algorithm with known rewards and dynamics and existing algorithms for multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), MF-AQ demonstrates superior numerical performance in terms of computational efficiency.
Related works.
On learning large population games with mean-field approximations, (Yang et al., 2017) focused on inverse reinforcement learning for MFGs without decision making, studied an MARL problem with a mean-field approximation term modeling the interaction between one agent and all the other finite agents, and (Kizilkale & Caines, 2013) and (Yin et al., 2014 ) considered model-based adaptive learning for MFGs. For learning large population games without mean-field approximation, see (Kapoor, 2018; Hernandez-Leal et al., 2018) and the references therein.
In the specific topic of learning auctions with a large number of advertisers, (Cai et al., 2017) and (Jin et al., 2018) explored reinforcement learning techniques to search for social optimal solutions with real-word data, and (Iyer et al., arXiv:1901.09585v2 [math.OC] 
Apr 2019
Learning mean-field games 2011) used MFGs to model the auction system with unknown conversion of clicks within a Bayesian framework.
On the subject of reinforcement learning, Q-learning and its variants have been widely applied to various problems with empirical success. In particular, the combination of deep neural networks and Q-learning has been the fundamental building block for some of the most successful human-level AIs (Mnih et al., 2015; Haarnoja et al., 2017) . Apart from Qlearning, there are also policy gradient (Sutton et al., 2000) and actor-critic algorithms (Konda & Tsitsiklis, 2000) ). On the theoretical side, several algorithms have also been proposed with near-optimal regret bounds. (See (Osband et al., 2013) and (Jaksch et al., 2010) .) However, none of these works formulated the problem of simultaneous learning and decision-making in the MFG framework.
Problem Setting

Background: classical MFG and N -player game
Let us first recall the classical n-player games in a discrete time setting, There are n agents in a game with a finite state space S and a finite action space A, in an infinite time horizon. At each step t, t = 0, 1, . . . , ∞, decisions are made. At step t, each agent i has her own state s i t ∈ S ⊆ R d and needs to take an action a i t ∈ A ⊆ R p ; moreover, given the current state profile s t = (s 1 t , . . . , s n t ) ∈ S n and her action a i t , an agent i will receive a reward r i (s t , a i t ), and her state will change to s
, where r i is the reward function for agent i and P i is the transition probability for agent i. The admissible policy/control for agent i is of a Markovian form π i : S n → ∆ |A| , which maps each state profile s ∈ S n to a randomized action.
, which is the probability simplex.
In this infinite time setting, a discount factor γ ∈ (0, 1) is used to define the accumulated reward (a.k.a. the value function) for agent i, with the initial state profile s and the policy profile π = (π 1 , . . . , π n ):
where , a t i ∼ π i (s t ), and s t+1 i
The goal of each agent is to find policy which maximizes her value function. Mathematically speaking, player i will solve the following control problem:
There are different performance criteria for solving an nplayer game. The most well-known one is the Nash equilibrium (NE), a policy profile under which no agent can improve her value if other agents fix their policies.
Definition 2.1 (NE for n-player games). π is a Nash equilibrium policy profile for the n-player game (1) if for all i = 1, . . . , n and the state profile s,
holds for any π i : S n → ∆ |A| .
A stochastic nonzero-sum n-player game is notoriously hard to analyze. When n is large, the complexity of the problem grows exponentially with respect to n. Mean field game (MFG), pioneered by (Huang et al., 2006) and (Lasry & Lions, 2007) , considers the case when n → ∞ and provides an ingenious and tractable aggregation approach to the otherwise challenging n-player stochastic games. By the functional strong law of large numbers, it was shown that the NE of an MFG is an -NE to the n-player game. (See (Cardaliaguet et al., 2015) for regular controls and (Guo & Lee, 2017) 
In this MFG setting, at time t, after the representative agent chooses her action a t according to some policy π : S × ∆ |S| → ∆ |A| , she will receive reward r(s t , a t , µ t ) and her state will transfer under a controlled stochastic dynamics of mean-field type P (·|s t , a t , µ t ). And we can define stationary NE for MFGs as follows. 
2. (Population side) P st = µ for all t ≥ 0, where
is the dynamics under control π starting from s 0 ∼ µ , with a t ∼ π (s t , µ ), s t+1 ∼ P (·|s t , a t , µ ).
The single agent side condition here is exactly a counterpart of Eqn. (2), which captures the optimality of π with the population side fixed. The additional population side condition is to ensure the "consistency" of the solution, which guarantees that the state distribution flow of the single agent does match the population state sequence {µ } ∞ t=0 .
General N -player game and GMFG
In the N -player games and MFGs defined above, the reward and dynamics only depend on the states of all players and the action of the player herself. However, this setting is not general enough to incorporate the auction example mentioned in the introduction, where the rewards and dynamics rely on the actions of all players. To allow the dependency on other players' actions, we consider the following general N -player game, where rewards and transition dynamics depend on all players' actions a a a t = (a 1 t , . . . , a n t ). Here r i and P i are possibly unknown.
Accordingly, we can also define the generalized MFG (GMFG), where the representative agent is facing the following control problem:
|S||A| is the joint distribution of the state and the action (i.e., the population state-action pair). It has marginal distributions α t denoting population action distribution and µ t denoting population state distribution.
In this GMFG setting, at time t, after the representative agent chooses her action a t according to some policy π : S × ∆ |S||A| → ∆ |A| , she will receive reward r(s t , a t , L t ) and her state will transfer according to P (·|s t , a t , L t ), where r and P are possibly unknown. Similarly, by replacing µ with L , we define the stationary NE for GMFGs. Definition 2.3 (stationary NE for GMFGs). In (GMFG), an agent-population profile (π , L ) is called a stationary NE if 1. (Single agent side) For any policy π and any initial state s ∈ S, we have
is the dynamics under control π starting from s 0 ∼ µ , with a t ∼ π (s t , µ ), s t+1 ∼ P (·|s t , a t , L ), and µ being the population state marginal of L .
Remark. One can also define NE for GMFGs without the stationarity condition. However, if we are not seeking for stationary solution, Q functions (see Section 3 and 4) are time dependent and it is infeasible to apply the Q-learning algorithm to be introduced below.
Example. Take the example of the repeated auction with a budget constraint in Section 1. Denote s t ∈ [C max ] as the budget of a representative advertiser at time t, where [n] = {0, 1, · · · , n} and C max ∈ N + is the maximum budget allowed on the Ad exchange with a unit bidding price, and a t the bid price submitted by this advertiser.
At each round of the auction, assume a random number, say K bidders, will be randomly selected from the population to compete for the auction. Here K reflects the intensity of the bidding game. (See (Iyer et al., 2011) for the discussion on K and Figure 6 in this paper for related numerical analysis.) Denote α t as the bidding distribution of the population. The maximum bid D t from the K − 1 opponents has a cumulative mass function
Finally, the reward for the representative advertiser, say player 1, with bid a 1, meaning the first advertiser wins the bid, is with probabil-
The dynamics of the budget is
The updated action distribution is α t+1 = µ t , π t+1 (·, µ t ) , where ·, · stands for inner product. In this example, both the rewards r t and the dynamics s t are unknown.
Solution for GMFGs
Parallel to the classical MFG framework, we now establish the existence and uniqueness of the NE solution to (GMFG).
The classical way to solve for NE of MFGs is three-step fixed-point approach, (see (Huang et al., 2006) and (Lasry & Lions, 2007) ). To start, we generalize the approach to fit in GMFG setting.
•
Step 1: given L, solve the following stochastic control problem to get π L :
Step 2: given π L , update from L for one time step to get L following the dynamics.
Step 3: Check whether L matches L, and repeat.
If the above three-step fixed-point iteration defines a contractive mapping, then the approach will finally lead to the unique stationary NE of the GMFG. This idea is key to the establishment of existence and uniqueness of the NE solution.
Take any fixed L ∈ ∆ |S||A| , define a mapping
is an optimal policy that satisfies the single agent side condition for the population state-action pair L, i.e.,
for any policy π and any initial state s ∈ S.
This Assumption is closely related to the feedback regularity (FR) condition in the classical MFG literature (Huang et al., 2006) . Note that the optimal policy may not be unique, and for now Γ 1 can be understood to map to an arbitrarily chosen optimal randomized policy. We will specify the choice of the policy at the end of this section.
Next, for any admissible policy π ∈ Π and a joint population state-action pair L ∈ ∆ |S||A| , define a mapping Γ 2 : Π × ∆ |S||A| → ∆ |S||A| as follows:
where 
Notice that here with L fixed, π(s, L) is understood as a vector of length |S||A|.
Remark. The two mappings Γ 1 and Γ 2 defined above correspond to
Step 1 and Step 2 in the three-step fixed point approach respectively. 
And since
, by the Banach fixed-point theorem, we conclude that there exists a unique fixed-point of Γ, or equivalently, a unique stationary MFG solution to (GMFG).
In align with the reinforcement learning algorithm to be proposed in the next section, we specify the choice of the optimal policy in the mapping Γ 1 to be the one that assigns equal probability over all optimal actions for a given state. Specifically, we define
, where Q L is the Q-function to be introduced in Section 4. Here the argmax-e operator is a generalized argmax operator, defined to map the set of argmax components to the randomized actions, such that actions with equal maximum Q-values would have equal probabilities to be selected. Note that, this is different from the usual set-valued argmax operator. Mathematically, argmax-e : R n → R n is a mapping with argmax-e(x) i = 1/N x for i ∈ argmax i x i and argmax-e(x) i = 0 for i / ∈ argmax i x i , where N x = #argmax i x i . By definition, Γ 1 (L) is the optimal policy for an MDP with dynamics P L and R L (to be introduced in Section 4), and therefore satisfies the single agent side condition in Definition 2.3.
RL Algorithms for GMFGs
When the reward and transition distributions are unknown in the generalized MFG setting, one needs to learn the system while solving the MFG at the same time. This is related to the classical reinforcement learning problem, with the key differences being MDPs replaced with MFGs and global optimum replaced by NEs.
Recall that in Step 1 of the three-step fixed-point approach above, given L , one can retrieve π L by solving an MDP with transition dynamics P L (s |s, a) := P (s |s, a, L ) and rewards r L (s, a) := r(s, a, L ). Extending this to a general population state-action pair L, the Q-function of an MDP M L with dynamics P L and R L is defined as
where V L is the optimal value function of the MDP, and it can be shown that V *
. When reward R L and transition dynamics P L (s |s, a) are known, a value iteration method based on (12) can be applied until convergence to estimate the Q-function:
However, when the reward R L and transition dynamics P L (s |s, a) are unknown, one can only update the Qfunction based on samples, which leads to Q-learning. The Q-learning algorithm approximates the value iteration by stochastic approximation. In each step, at state s, one takes action a based on Q L , reaches state s , and then the Qfunction is updated as follows:
which is essentially replacing the expectation in the value iteration with an unbiased sample. The algorithm then proceeds to choose action a based on the updated Q L . With appropriate β t (s, a) and exploration strategies (e.g., -greedy and Boltzmann exploration) in choosing a , Q L is then guaranteed to converge to Q for each pair of state and action.
Now it is natural to consider the following (naive) iterative algorithm (Algorithm 1), which replaces
Step 1 in the three-step fixed-point approach of GMFGs with Q-learning iterations.
In Algorithm 1, each iteration needs to perform Q-learning to find the exact values of the Q functions, which is not feasible. In practice, one can only perform finite number of Q-learning steps to obtain approximated values. In the meanwhile, argmax-e operator is non-smooth, not even continuous.
Algorithm 1 Alternating Q-learning for GMFGs (Naive)
Perform Q-learning to find the Q-function
of an MDP with dynamics P L k (s |s, a) and rewards r L k (s, a).
4:
Solve π k ∈ Π with π k (s) = argmax-e (Q k (s, ·)).
5:
Sample s ∼ µ k , where µ k is the population state marginal of L k , and obtain L k+1 from G(s, π k , L k ). 6: end for Example. Let x = (1, 1), then argmax-e(x) = (1/2, 1/2). For any > 0, let y = (1, 1 − ), then argmax-e(y) = (1, 0). This shows the discontinuity and sensitivity of operator argmax-e.
This example demonstrates that even with very close approximated Q values, the policy adopted in this naive algorithm may still be far away from the optimal one, which explains the failure of Algorithm 1 shown in Figure 1 .
Stabilized Reinforcement Learning for GMFGs
In this section, we propose a practical and stabilized modification to Algorithm 1 for solving (GMFG). To address the issues in Algorithm 1, we made three modifications.
First, as is mentioned, in Algorithm 1, the update of Q k requires fully solving an MDP with infinite many steps, which is impractical. This issue can be resolved by using approximate Q-learning updates.
Secondly, to stabilize the performance, we use Boltzmann policy (softmax operator, to be defined below) to replace the argmax-e operator. Boltzmann policy enjoys the nice property of smoothness (see Lemma 3) and it is also close to the argmax-e (see Lemma 4), which guarantees the closeness between the policy adopted and the optimal one.
Finally, since Boltzmann policies are non-optimal, an additional modification is needed to control the error. Indeed, as shown in Lemma 4, for any population state-action pair L, given the positive action gap δ ) > 0, the difference between a Boltzmann policy and an optimal policy can always be controlled by choosing the hyper-parameter c in the softmax operator accordingly. However, the infimum of δ s L over (an infinite number of) L can be 0, which would make it impossible to control the sub-optimality for all L. To address this issue, in each step, we project L k to a finite (and potentially non-uniform) grid, which we call -net (to be introduced below). This projection step is essential to control the action gap and hence the sub-optimality of Boltzmann policies.
Action gaps and -net. We begin by noticing the following facts related to -net and action gaps.
For any > 0, there exist a positive function φ( ) and annet
. . , N , s ∈ S, and any a / ∈ argmax a∈A Q L (i) (s, a).
Here the existence of -nets is trivial due to the compactness of the probability simplex ∆ |S||A| , and the existence of φ( ) comes from the finiteness of the action set A.
The action gaps characterize the extent to which actions are distinguishable in terms of the corresponding Q-values. They are crucial for approximation algorithms (Bellemare et al., 2016) , and are closely related to the problemdependent bounds for regret analysis in reinforcement learning, multi-armed bandits, and advantage learning algorithms including A2C (Minh et al., 2016) .
ALTERNATING APPROXIMATE Q-LEARNING
In the following, we assume that for any > 0, S and φ( ) are known to the algorithm. In practice, one can choose a special form D α with D > 0 for φ( ). The exponent α > 0 characterizes the decay rate of the action gaps on the fineness of the -nets. In practice, we find it sufficient to take S as a uniform grid with appropriate grid sizes, which is also adopted in the numerical experiments.
In addition, to enable Q-learning, we assume that one has access to a population simulator (See (Pérolat et al., 2016; Wai et al., 2018) ). That is, for any policy π ∈ Π, given the current state s ∈ S, for any joint law L (with population state marginal µ), we can obtain the next agent state s ∼ P (·|s, π(s, µ), L), a reward r = r(s, π(s, µ), L), and the next population state-action pair L = P s ,π(s ,µ) . For brevity, we denote the simulator as (s , r, L ) = G(s, π, L).
Combining the three modifications above, the resulting algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 2.
Here softmax c : R n → R n is defined as
and
As is mentioned earlier, this softmax c operator is smooth and close to argmax-e. The details about the choices of hyperparameters c and T k will be discussed in details in Lemma 5 and Theorem 2.
In the special case when the rewards r L and transition dynamics P (·|s, a, L) are known, Algorithm 2 can be reduced to a value-iteration based algorithm, as follows.
Algorithm 2 Alternating Approximate Q-learning for GMFGs (MF-AQ)
Perform Q-learning for T k iterations to find the approximate Q-functionQ k (s, a) =Q L k (s, a) of an MDP with dynamics P L k (s |s, a) and rewards r L k (s, a).
4:
Compute π k ∈ Π with π k (s) = softmax c (Q k (s, ·)).
5:
Sample s ∼ µ k , where µ k is the population state marginal of L k , and obtainL k+1 from G(s, π k , L k ).
6:
Find L k+1 = Proj S (L k+1 ) 7: end for
Convergence
We now show that for any given tolerance > 0, the MF-AQ algorithm (Algorithm 2) converges to an -Nash solution of (GMFG).
Theorem 2 (Convergence of MF-AQ).
Assume the same conditions in Theorem 1 and the same conditions specified below in Lemma 5. For any tolerances , δ > 0, 
The proof of Theorem 2 depends on the following Lemmas 3, 4, and 5. Lemma 3 shows the Lipschitz continuity property of the softmax operater. Lemma 4 discusses the closeness between softmax and the argmax-e. Finally, Lemma 5 establishes the complexity of Q-learning for solving the MDP subproblem with a fixed L k . It also provides guidance on how to choose the number of inner iterations T k in Algorithm 2.
Lemma 3 ( (Gao & Pavel, 2017) ). The softmax function is cLipschitz, i.e., softmax c (x) − softmax c (y) 2 ≤ c x − y 2 for any x, y ∈ R n .
Lemma 4. The distance between the softmax and the argmax mapping is bounded by
where δ = max i=1,...,n x i − max xj <maxi=1,...,n xi x j , with δ := ∞ when all x j are equal.
Proof. Without loss of generality, let us assume that
Algorithm 3 Alternating Approximate Value Iteration for GMFGs (MF-VI)
Perform value iteration for T k iterations to find the approximate Q-function Q L k and value function V L k :
4:
for all s ∈ S and s ∈ A do 6:
end for 9:
end for 10:
Compute a policy π k ∈ Π:
Sample s ∼ µ k , where µ k is the population state marginal of L k , and
12:
Lemma 5 ((Even- Dar & Mansour, 2003) ). For an MDP, say M, suppose that the Q-learning algorithm takes step-sizes
with ω ∈ (1/2, 1). Here #(s, a, t) is the number of times up to time t that one visits the state-action pair (s, a). Also suppose that the covering time of the state-action pairs is bounded by L with probability at least 1 − p for some p ∈ (0, 1). Then Q T M (δ, ) − Q 2 ≤ with probability at least 1 − 2δ. Here Q T is the T -th update in Q-learning, and Q is the (optimal) Q-function, given that
where β = (1 − γ)/2, V max = R max /(1 − γ), and R max is an upper bound on the extreme difference between the expected rewards, i.e., max
Here the covering time #(s, a, t) of a state-action pair sequence is defined to be the number of steps needed to visit all state-action pairs starting from any arbitrary state-action pair. T M (δ, ) is the number of inner iterations T k set in Algorithm 2. This will guarantee the convergence result in Theorem 2.
In the following, softmax c (Q L ) is understood as the concatenation of softmax c (Q L (s, ·)) into a vector of length |S||A|. Let L be the population state-action pair in a stationary NE solution of (GMFG). Then we have
Then since L k ∈ S by the projection step, by Lemma 4, Lemma 5 (and the choice of
Finally, it is clear that with probability at least 1 − 2δ k ,
By telescoping, this implies that with probability at least 1 − 2
Since k is summable and sup k≥0 k < ∞, we
Taking the limit K → ∞, and by d ∈ [0, 1) and c = log(1/ ) φ( ) , we have that with probability at least
By appropriately specifying the choices of k and δ k , the following complexity result can also be established with slight modification to the proof of Theorem 2. Theorem 6 (Complexity of MF-AQ). Assume the same conditions as in Theorem 2. Given any , δ > 0, set
and c = log(1/ ) φ( ) . Then with probability at least 1 − 2δ, L K ,η − L 2 = O( ), and the total number of iterations T =
Here K ,η is the number of outer iterations, set to K ,η := 2 max (η ) −1/η , log d ( / |S||A| + 1) .
Notice that here the constant omitted in O(·) is independent of δ, and η, but dependent on the number of states and actions |S| and |A|, the bound R max of the reward function, the discount factor γ, the covering time L (with probability at least 1 − p), and the step-size exponent ω.
Proof. In the proof for Theorem 2, by plugging in K = K ,η and the choice of δ k , we have that with prob-
By plugging in k = (k + 1) −(1+η) , we obtain that when K ,η ≥ 2(log d + 1),
In sum, if K ,η = 2 max{(η ) −1/η , log d ( / |S||A|) + 1} , we have that with probability at least 1 − 2δ,
Finally, by plugging in k and δ k into T M L (δ k , k ), and by noticing that k ≥ K ,η and
α+1 , we immediately arrive at
By further relaxing η to 1, and merging the terms, we finally arrive at (15).
Experiment: repeated auction game with budget constraint
In this section, we test the proposed MF-AQ Algorithm against Naive, MF-VI, and a couple of popular RL algorithms.
Recall that in the repeated auction game, the goal is for each advertiser to learn to bid in an online sequential repeated auction, when there are budget constraints and a large population of bidders. Here we assume that the distributions of the conversion of clicks v and the reward function R are unknown as in Section 2.2.
To emphasize the impact of α t , here we fix the budget distribution as independent of time and known a prior. That is, µ t = µ C and given. This can be realized by considering new players joining the competition according to a Poisson process.
Here are the parameters used in the experiments: the temperature parameter c = 4.0, the discount factor γ = 0.2, ω = 0.87 in Lemma 5, and the overbidding penalty δ = 0.2. Assume |S| = 10, |A| = 10, and the budget distribution µ C = uniform[9].
Comparing MF-AQ with Naive algorithm
Naive algorithm Assume K = 5, v is uniform [4] , and α 0 is uniform [9] . Moreover, set 10000 inner iterations step between two consecutive updates of action distributions. MF-AQ Assume the same conversion of clicks v as uniform [4] .
In comparison to the Naive algorithm, MF-AQ Algorithm is computationally more efficient: it converges after about 10 outer iterations; as the number of inner iterations increases, the error decreases; and finally, MF-AQ is responsive to the conversion of the clicks even though it is unknown to the advertisers, as shown in Figure 3 . 
Comparing MF-AQ with MF-VI
In addition to Theorem 2 that provides the convergence guarantee of the MF-AQ algorithm when reward and transition dynamics are unknown, the experiment shows that MF-AQ performs well against MF-VI, which assumes known reward and transition dynamics. = 5000 inner iterations. MF-VI Algorithm converges faster than MF-AQ Algorithm, as the latter needs to make decisions with simultaneous learning whereas the former is performed with given dynamics and rewards. The relative L 2 distance between the Q-tables of these two Algorithms is ∆Q := QMF-VI−QMF-AQ 2 QMF-VI 2 = 0.098879. This implies that MF-AQ Algorithm learns well: it learns the true MFG solution with 90-percent accuracy with 10000 inner iterations.
Comparing MF-AQ with existing learning algorithms.
We next compare the MF-AQ algorithm with some popular multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithms: (1) IL algorithm and (2) MF-Q algorithm. IL algorithm (Tan, 1993) considers n independent learners and each player solves a decentralized reinforcement learning problem without considering other players in the system. The MF-Q algorithm is an extension of the NASH-Q Learning algorithm for general n-player game introduced in (Hu & Wellman, 2003) . It considers the the aggregate actions (ā a a −i = j =i aj n−1 ) from the opponent of each player. This Performance Criterion: For a given policy π, the following metric (Pérolat et al., 2018 ) is adopted to measure how close the policy is to an NE policy:
If π π π * is an NE, by definition C(π π π * ) = 0 and it is easy to check that C(π π π) ≥ 0. Policy arg max πi V i (s s s, (π π π −i , π i ))) is called the best response to π π π −i .
Note that there are other performance criteria in the literature such as the total discounted reward. However, in a game setting, these may not be appropriate as high rewards for one player may not be beneficial for the others.
Here we assume v is uniform [4] . IL algorithm converges the fastest around 10000 iterations with the largest error 0.1913. This is because IL Algorithm does not incorporate information from other players. MF-Q algorithm converges around 250000 iterations with smaller error 0.1131. This error is still bigger than the error from MF-AQ. This is because MF-Q can only incorporate the first order information from the population instead of the empirical distribution from the whole population, which is not enough for the auction game. The performance of MF-AQ improves as the number of total iterations increases, and converges to the lowest error 0.0691 around 20000 total iterations. is no bigger than 3. When K increases, players start to act more aggressively and bid over 3 more frequently. Similar observations are obtained when v ∼ exp(4), as shown in Figure 6 (c).
Additional insight of MF-AQ.
Conclusion
This paper builds a generalized mean-field games framework for simultaneous learning and decision-making, establishes the existence and uniqueness of appropriate Nash equilibrium solutions, and proposes a Q-learning algorithm with proven convergence. Numerical experiments demonstrate superior performance compared to existing RL algorithms.
